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COMMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF Po-
LITICAL AcTIVITY-Watkins v. United States RE-EXAMINED-The 
scope of congressional investigations has expanded in recent years 
from traditional areas of legislative fact finding and government 
malfunction to include that of exposure of political deviation from 
an established norm. In an era when departure from accepted 
modes of political thought may have harsh results for the deviant, 
serious questions have arisen concerning the propriety as well as 
the power of Congress to expose those individuals. While the Fifth 
Amendment remains an established bulwark against incriminat-
ing inquiries,1 it is no protection against unwarranted inferences 
which the public may draw from its use.2 In Watkins v. United 
States3 the Supreme Court gave strong evidence of limiting the 
congressional power to compel testimony in the political area, 
both by suggesting that the First Amendment would bar inquiries 
by the committee in question, and by adopting a broad interpre-
tation of the statutory requirement that Congress may compel 
testimony only by questions "pertinent to the question under in-
quiry."4 However in Barenblatt v. United States,5 the Court has 
held that the First Amendment is not a valid ground for refusing 
to answer questions proposed by a congressional investigating com-
mittee in the area of Communist activity. It is the function of this 
comment to examine the traditional scope and limitations of con-
gressional investigations, with particular emphasis on these two 
cases.6 
1 The use of the Fifth Amendment privilege in congressional investigatory hearings 
has been consistently upheld. E.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak 
v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Blau 
v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950). But cf. United States v. Thomas, (W.D. Ky. 1943) 
49 F. Supp. 547 (immunity destroys the privilege); note, 35 MARQ. L. REv. 282 at 286 (1952). 
2 CAUGHEY, IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER 123-133 (1958). It has been argued that 
when a witness exercises the privilege an inference of guilt is entirely permissible. HooK, 
COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1957). The contrary view is expressed by 
GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955). 
3 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
4 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. (1958) §192. For the enitre text of the statute, see note 
59 infra. 
o 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
6 On this subject, see, generally, "Congressional Investigations-A Symposium," 18 
UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 421 (1951); McGeary, "The Congressional Power of Investigation," 28 
NEB. L. REv. 516 (1949); Nutting, "Freedom of Silence," 47 MICH. L. REv. 181 (1948); 
Landis, "Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation," 40 
HARV. L. REv. 153 (1926); notes, 70 HARv. L. REv. 671 (1957); 65 YALE L.J. 1159 (1956). 
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J. SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATORY POWER 
Congress' power to investigate and to compel testimony in 
connection with the investigation is not explicitly stated in the 
Constitution. However, as early as 1821 the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that an implied power to investigate was essential to the 
enumerated powers of government.7 Like any other implied 
power,8 requirements have arisen that the investigation must be 
in conjunction with and reasonably necessary to some explicit 
power. In Kilbourn v. Thompson,9 the Court ruled that Congress 
could not compel testimony when the particular investigation 
could not possibly be connected to any valid congressional purpose. 
While the opinion has often been cited for the principle that Con-
gress has no "general power of making inquiry into the private 
affairs of the citizen,"10 subsequent cases have refused to extend 
the doctrine to cover investigations authorized for valid legislative 
purposes. In McGrain v. Daugherty,11 the Court explicitly held 
that the mere fact that the information required was private was 
not sufficient to deprive the government of the right of knowing of 
it, if the information was pertinent and in aid of its constitutional 
power. This holding was approved in Sinclair v. United States,12 
and has been universally followed. 
7 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821) (attempted bribe of a legislator). Until 
1857, trying the accused before the bar of the Senate or House was the accepted procedure. 
At that time, contempt was made a statutory offense: 11 Stat. 156 (1857). The constitu-
tionality of the act was upheld in In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897). The present form 
of the act is nearly unchanged: 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. (1958) §192. For an analysis 
of the differences in contempt trials and proceedings at the bar of Congress, see United 
States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950) (dissenting opinion). 
s The implied powers of the Constitution were recognized by Justice Marshall in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819). See Dodd, "Implied Powers and 
Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law," 29 YALE L.J. 137 (1919). 
9103 U.S. 168 (1880). The case arose out of an investigation of the failure of a 
banking firm which was a depository of federal funds. For the authorizing resolution of 
the committee, see 4 CoNG. REc. 598 (1876). 
10 103 U.S. 168 at 190; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 at 294 (1929); McGrain 
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 173-174 (1927). Accord: Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 
317 U.S. 501 (1943); Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 at 478 (1894) 
(administrative agencies exercising adjudicatory and rule making function). 
11273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
12 279 U.S. 263 at 294 (1929). This case was an outgrowth of the scandals surrounding 
the granting of oil leases at Teapot Dome during the Harding administration. The 
validity of investigations in this area was clearly recognized by the Court: "Congress has 
plenary power to • • • make all needful rules and regnlations respecting the • • . public 
lands and property of the United States. And undoubtedly the Senate had power to 
delegate authority to its committee to investigate and report what had been and was being 
done by the executive departments .•• and to make any other inquiry concerning the 
public domain." 
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In light of the McGrain holding, one writer has gone so far as 
to suggest that the Kilbourn case has been overruled.13 While it 
would be unfair to say that the restrictive view of the Kilbourn 
case is no longer recognized as applied to similar fact situations, it 
is clear that a continual broadening of the concept of a valid legisla-
tive purpose has rendered the possibility of a direct application of 
the case a negligible one. In McGrain v. Daugherty,14 a district 
court holding that the mere mention of legislation as "an after-
thought" could not validate the investigation was specifically over-
ruled.15 In its opinion, the Supreme Court made it clear that once 
any indication of a congressional purpose was found in the au-
thorizing resolution, a presumption immediately arose as to the 
validity of the proceedings.16 The use of a judicial presumption 
of validity of the investigation would- seem wise in light of the 
nearly impossible burden on the government, in some cases, to 
prove a valid legislative purpose. This is especially true since some 
courts have conceded that in certain areas, the power of investiga-
tion may be broader than the congressional power from which it 
flows.17 One federal court has gone to the point of presuming the 
validity of the subject matter itself,18 contrary to the McGrain 
doctrine, which would at least examine the subject matter before 
invoking the presumption. With this suggested modification, 
every congressional investigation for any purpose would be pre-
sumed valid. This approach has not as yet been adopted by any 
other tribunal. 
13 Cousens, "The Purpose and Scope of Investigation Under Legislative Authority," 
26 GEO. L.J. 905 at 918 (1938). 
14 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
15 Ex parte Daugherty, (S.D. Ohio 1924) 299 F. 620. For a discussion of both district 
and Supreme Court opinions in the McGrain case, see note, 41 MINN. L. R.Ev. 622 at 624 
(1957). 
16 "The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation 
was to aid in legislating; and we think the subject-matter was such that the presumption 
should be indulged that this was the real object." 273 U.S. 135 at 178 (1927). It has been 
suggested that the reason for the Court's reluctance to examine the nature of the pro-
ceedings was respect for the committee's long record of effective service in ridding govern-
ment of corruption. Note, 65 YALE L.J. 1159 (1956). 
17While Congress may not legislate regarding primary elections, investigations in 
the area are valid. Compare Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921) with Seymour 
v. United States, (8th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 577. "There is a vast difference between the 
necessities for inquiry and the necessities for action." Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 
1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 247, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948). See also United States v. 
Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948); note, 23 NoTRE 
DAME LAWYER 353 at 354 (1948). 
18 United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58, revd. per curiam on other 
grounds (D.C. Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 525, revd. on other grounds 339 U.S. 323 (1950). 
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A. Legitimate Areas of Investigation 
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized only two valid 
congressional purposes for investigation: legislation,19 and the 
composition and order of Congress itself.20 However, once Con-
gress has authorized an investigation there seems to be no way to 
show that the authorization is unconnected with one of these pur-
poses. It is not necessary for Congress by its authorization to indi-
cate what legislation will result from the inquiry.21 The mere 
possibility that some legislation may ensue seems to be sufficient.::2 
Nor does the fact that no valid legislation has previously originated 
as a result of the committee's findings invalidate a continued 
authorization.23 Even if the committee is operating in an area 
where legislation would apparently be unconstitutional, one court 
has suggested that the committee's findings may result in repeal of 
unconstitutional legislation already existing, and is therefore 
valid.24 The result is that with the barest recital of congressional 
purpose the areas of investigative activity have become nearly 
limitless. Since the Kilbourn case, not one decision has held a 
witness immune from contempt on the basis that the purpose of 
the investigation was invalid. 
B. The Presumption of Purpose 
While the presumption of valid purpose prescribed in the 
McGrain case has never been seriously challenged, the conclusive-
ness of the presumption has come under constant judicial scrutiny. 
Basically, the question is whether the actions of the investigative 
committee itself can destroy the presumption that it is acting 
19 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (un-American activities); Sinclair 
v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929) (public domain); Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 
U.S. 151 (1923) (corporations); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporations); Smith 
v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U.S. 33 (1917) (interstate commerce); Interstate 
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894) (interstate commerce). 
20 Seymour v. United States, (8th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 577 (primary elections); Barry 
v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929) (elections); In re Chapman, 166 
U.S. 661 (1897) (grounds for expulsion). 
21 United States v. Orman, (3d Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 148; McGrain v. Daugherty, 
273 U.S. 135 at 177-178 (1927). Cf. People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 2 N.E. 
615 (1885) (cited in McGrain v. Daugherty). 
22 Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 
(1948). 
23 Townsend v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 352, cert. den. 303 U.S. 664 
(1938). 
24 United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 at 90-91, cert. den. 333 
U.S. 838 (1948). 
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for valid congressional ends. To put the problem in its modern 
context, can the statements and actions of committee members in 
evaluating their function, as that of an exposing "grand jury" for 
example,25 destroy the presumption that they are in fact perform-
ing a congressional function? This example clearly defines the 
problem, since the courts have never expressly acknowledged the 
existence of a congressional power of "exposure for exposure's 
sake."26 
In Sinclair v. United States,27 the Court indicated that there 
were at least some limits of purpose, beyond which the committee 
could not go and still retain the stamp of validity.28 However, the 
Court decided that under the circumstances of the case, the com-
mittee had not significantly deviated from its authorized purpose. 
In only one case have the committee's actions, at the time of hear-
ing, been considered controlling as to the validity of the investiga-
tion. In United States v. Icardi,29 a prosecution for perjury,30 the 
court held that a committee could not be considered as "com-
petent" if it was not pursuing a legislative purpose at the time 
when it secured the testimony, "even though that very testimony 
be relevant to a matter which could be the subject of a valid legisla-
tive investigation."31 Other federal courts have taken exactly the 
opposite position. In Morford v. United States32 the court held 
that once the presumption of validity arises, "it cannot be rebutted 
by impugning the motives of the individual members of the com-
25 E.g., "I serve notice on the un-American elements in this country now that this 
'grand jury' will be in session to investigate un-American activities at all times." Remarks 
of Rep. Rankin, 91 CONG. REC. 275 (1945). "[T]he House Committee on Un-American 
Activities is empowered to explore and expose activities by un-American individuals and 
organizations, which while sometimes being legal, are nevertheless inimical to our Ameri-
can concepts and our American future ...• " H. Rep. 2742, 79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 16 
(1947). See note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 (1947). 
26 E.g., Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 
U.S. 178 at 200 (1957); Rumely v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 166 at 173, 
affd. 345 U.S. 41 (1953); United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 at S9, 
cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948). 
27 279 U.S. 263 (1929). 
28 Sinclair claimed that the committee was really attempting to publicize facts relating 
to a pending court controversy and pointed to the committee's refusal to sustain his 
motion to exempt such facts from the inquiry. The Court held that this was "not enough 
to show that the committee intended to depart from the purpose to ascertain whether 
additional legislation might be advisable." 279 U.S. 263 at 295 (1929). 
29 (D.C. D.C. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 383. The case is discussed in comment, 9 STAN. L. 
REv. 574 at 581 (1957). 
ao For a comparison between perjury and contempt before congressional investigating, 
committees, see comment, 9 STAN. L. REV. 574 at 581 (1957). 
31 United States v. Icardi, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 383 at 388. Cf. Quinn v. 
United States, 349 U.S. 155 at 161 (1955). 
a2 (D.C. Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 54, revd. on other grounds 339 U.S. 258 (1950). 
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mittee." In Josephson v. United States,83 the court held that once 
the authorization stated a valid purpose, that purpose became 
established, "regardless of any statement by the Committee or its 
members intimating the contrary." While the claim of invalid 
purpose has been raised constantly in contempt proceedings, it has 
never prevailed. 
The Supreme Court has considered this problem extensively 
in two recent decisions. In Watkins v. United States,84 the Court, 
while stating that there was no congressional power "to expose for 
the sake of exposure," also made it plain that the committee's 
motives were not conclusive on the issue. In effect, the Court 
made clear the distinction between the motives of Congress and 
motives of the committee.35 The Court suggested that if Congress 
itself had intended mere exposure, then the purpose would be 
invalid.36 Although the discussion on this point was dictum, the 
Court gave strong indication of substantially limiting investiga-
tive powers in the future through scrutiny of congressional motive 
and authorization.37 However, in Barenblatt v. United States,38 
the Court gives exactly the opposite impression. As in Watkins, 
the Court points out that the motives of the committee are of no 
consequence in determining validity of purpose. But in Baren-
blatt the Court disregarded congressional as well as committee 
motives. The only test remaining, according to Barenblatt, is 
whether or not Congress acts pursuant to its constitutional power. 
If the authorizing resolution recites a valid purpose, whether or 
not that is the real purpose, the investigation will be conclusively 
33 (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948). 
34 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
35 "Their [committee members] motives would not vitiate an investigation which had 
been instituted by a House of Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose is being 
served." 354 U.S. 178 at 200 (1957). 
36 "We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of 
exposure." Id. at 200. 
37 Watkins may possibly be viewed as a high-water mark of a recent judicial trend 
toward greater protection from committee investigation. Previous decisions were based 
on more traditional limitations. E.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (Fifth 
Amendment); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (same); United States v. Rumely, 
345 U.S. 41 (1953) (statutory construction); United States v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 136 
F. Supp. 791 (jurisdiction). 
38 360 U.S. 109 (1959). Barenblatt had refused to answer questions as to his former 
or present membership in the Communist party. His contempt conviction was affirmed by 
the court of appeals, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 875. Certiorari was granted by the 
Supreme Court, judgment vacated, and the case remanded for reconsideration in the light 
of Watkins, 354 U.S. 930 (1957). Upon rehearing, the court of appeals reaffirmed by a 
divided court, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 252 F. (2d) 129. Certiorari was again granted by the 
Supreme Court, 356 U.S. 929 (1958). 
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presumed to be valid.39 By this extension, in a case involving 
First Amendment freedoms, the Court has flatly refused to recog-
nize the statement in Watkins that "the mere semblance of a legis-
lative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill 
of Rights.40 
It cannot be denied that these two cases represent fundamen-
tally different approaches to the problem.41 In Watkins the Court 
was willing to minimize both the propriety and ability of Congress 
to conduct investigations which result in little more than destruc-
tion of individual reputation. In Barenblatt the emphasis is 
placed upon the necessity of allowing a means by which Congress 
may gather information "over the whole range of national interests, 
concerning which Congress might legislate or decide upon due 
investigation not to legislate .... " Once the need and the legality 
of the power has been ascertained, the Court will refuse to deny it 
merely because it has been abused in some instances. 
The position of the Court in Barenblatt may be rationalized in 
two ways. Were the Court ever to adopt the doctrine that the 
varying motives of the committee, or even of Congress, could 
vitiate an otherwise valid investigation, it would then be faced 
with the nearly insurmountable difficulty of ascertaining what 
those motives were in particular instances. In any committee, 
there are bound to be men of differing motivation.42 In such a 
situation the difficult problem of whose motives are controlling is 
insoluble. The question of ascertaining the motives of Congress 
as a whole verges on the impossible. 
39 "So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary 
lacks authority to_ intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of 
that power." 360 U.S. 109 at 132 (1959). The discussion was not necessary as the court 
of appeals had held that "the primary purposes of the inquiry were in aid of legislative 
processes." (D.C. Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 875 at 881. 
40 354 U.S. 178 at 198 (1957). 
41 For an analysis of this difference in outlook, see Schwartz, "The Supreme Court-
1958 Term" 58 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1959). 
42 For example, in one public hearing two members of the Un-American Activities 
Committee took issue with each other over the methods employed. One, Rep. Clardy, 
was seemingly interested in discreditipg the witness before the public and press present at 
the hearings. Rep. Doyle, at least verbally, felt that such motivation was improper in 
view of the legislatively ordained function of the committee. The following colloquy re-
sulted when Rev. Jack McMichael was asked to identify a supposed past Communist 
associate. 
"Mr. Clardy: Would you know him if you saw him? 
Rev. McMichael (Witness): I'll be glad to look at him. 
Mr. Clardy: Answer my question: would you know him if you saw him? 
Rev. McMichael: How can I answer that question? I'll let the record show that ques-
tion-how unfair it is. 
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Second, there is a feeling on the part of the Court that the 
responsibility for insuring the usefulness of congressional com-
mittees should lie with the parent body of Congress and the popu-
lation as a whole. To restrain an otherwise lawful use of the 
legislative power because of an improper motive would be an 
abuse of the judicial function.43 Motives may be controlled by 
Congress only in appointing to committees men truly dedicated 
to legislative ends. 
Thus the conclusion emerges that while the Court has previ-
ously enunciated tests to limit "exposure for exposure's sake," and 
even currently has not explicitly recognized such a power, con-
gressional committees do possess a power of exposure, often un-
connected with the fact-finding process. Of course, the mere 
reluctance of the courts to admit the power does not of itself in-
dicate that it is undesirable. Throughout history some writers 
have felt that informing the public is in itself a valid congressional 
function.44 But most commentators have agreed that the danger 
that such a power could fall into irresponsible hands outweighs 
whatever value it may represent to society.415 
Mr. Clardy: If you were a truthful man, you would answer that question, sir. 
Mr. Doyle: Well now, Mr. Chairman-
Rev. McMichael: What kind of a question-
Mr. Doyle: Just a minute now. I don't want to differ with my distinguished col-
leagues, but I submit that sort of statement by a member of this committee is highly 
improper. 
Mr. Clardy: I stand by it. 
Mr. Doyle: It is highly improper at this time. We are not judges. We are here to 
get the facts, whatever they are, and I think it is very unfortunate to have to disagree with 
my colleagues, and yet I can't sit as a member of this committee and complacently be 
silent when that sort of statement is made from the committee bench. I just can't be silent. 
Mr. Clardy: You should be convinced by now, Mr. Doyle. 
Mr. Doyle: That is all right. Whatever I am convinced of, I am not going to announce 
from the bench before the hearing is over ..•. " 
Hearings Regarding Jack R. Mcl\fichael, House Committee on Un-American Activities, 
83d Cong., 1st sess., v. 2, p. 2771 (1953). 
43 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 at 55 (1904), quoted in Barenblatt v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 109 at 132-133 (1959). 
44 "Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and 
disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must remain in 
embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it 
should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred 
even to its legislative function." WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1885). See, 
also Liacos, "Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees," 33 BoST. UNIV. L. 
REv. 337 at 346 (1953); Herwitz and Mulligan, "The Legislative Investigating Committee," 
33 CoL. L. REv. I at 6, note 78 (1933). 
45 See Justice Frankfurter's discussion in Rumely v. United States, 345 U.S. 41 at 4;3-44 
(1952); Gellhorn, "Report on a Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties," 60 HARv. L. REv. 1193 (1947); notes, 70 HAR.v. L. REv. 671 (1957); 65 YALE L.J. 1159 
(1956); 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 (1947). 
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II. LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF INVESTIGATION 
While the original limitation of the Kilbourn case has become 
nearly meaningless, some effective safeguards do remain. These 
restrictions may be divided into two basic categories: jurisdic-
tional limitations and limitations of pertinency. 
A. Jurisdictional Limitations 
Any examination of the jurisdictional limits of an inquiry as-
sumes the fact that the authorizing resolution setting up the in-
quiry is within Congress' power. Once this is determined, it still 
must be shown that the particular inquiry directed to a witness 
falls within the scope of that authorizing resolution.46 In United 
States v. Kamin41 it was held that the presumption of a valid legis-
lative purpose does not apply in determining whether the com-
mittee has jurisdiction over a particular subject matter.48 But 
even more important, while recognizing that the committee might 
make some special inquiries outside of its jurisdiction "to the ex-
tent that such inquiry might cast light upon a subject over which it 
does have jurisdiction," the court reserved the right to inquire into 
the motives of the committee in deviating from their jurisdictional. 
area.49 In United States v. Lamont50 the court held an indictment 
defective when the authorized function of the committee had no 
apparent connection with the inquiry from which prosecution 
46 The authority of all investigating committees is prescribed by The Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946, c. 753, 60 Stat. 812, codified partially in 2 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 
1956) §§72b-l, 190-190 (g), 198. The act allocates jurisdiction of subject matter among 
the various committees, c. 753, §§102, 121, 60 Stat. 814, 822. While all standing commit• 
tees of the Senate are clothed with permanent power to compel testimony and require 
the production of documents, the only House Committee with such power is the Un-
American Activities Committee. 
47 (D.C. Mass. 1956) 136 F. Supp. 791. 
48 The investigation was conducted by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
of the Senate Committee on Government Operation, under authority given by The Leg• 
islative Reorganization Act of 1946, c. 753, §102 (g): "(2) Such committee shall have the 
duty of .•• 
(B) Studying the operation of Government activities at all levels with a view to 
determining its economy and efficiency." 
Questions directed to the witness regarding private manufacturers holding defense contracts 
with the federal government were considered prima fade outside the limit of the commit-
tee's jurisdiction. United States v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 136 F. Supp. 791 at 804. See 
also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 at 176 (1927) (dictum); Barsky v. United States, 
(D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 246, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (dictum). Cf. 
Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); Doidge v. Cunard S.S. Co., (1st Cir. 1927) 19 F. 
(2d) 500 at 502 (jurisdiction of federal courts is never presumed but must affirmatively 
appear). 
40 United States v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 136 F. Supp. 791 at 804. 
50 (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 312. 
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arose, and jurisdiction was not affirmatively alleged by the govern-
ment. The court recognized that "the result might be different" 
if the inquiry in question was apparently within the authority of 
the committee.51 
Recent cases have indicated, however, that jurisdictional 
bounds will be extremely difficult to delimit in the future. In the 
Barenblatt case, the Court recognized that the authorizing statute 
of the Un-American Activities Committee,52 criticized harshly in 
the Watkins case for its vagueness,53 was sufficient to confer upon 
the committee the power to investigate Communist activities. In 
ascertaining the intent of Congress, the court considered repeated 
re-authorization of and appropriation for the committee by Con-
gress as indirect approval of the investigation.54 While such in-
direct approval may be sufficient in some circumstances, the 
wisdom of the type of analysis seems doubtful where the authorized 
power conflicts with First Amendment freedoms.55 The reluc-
tance of the court to limit strictly the areas of investigation seems 
to be based on interpretation of legislative policy. One of the 
purposes of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 194656 was to 
establish permanent committees with broad powers, so that ad hoc 
committees would not have to be established to investigate related 
areas with resulting duplication and waste. To construe the au-
51 See United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 
838 (1948) (un-American activities); Bowers v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 
447 (organized crime in interstate commerce). But cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 
41 at 44 (1953) (lobbying). 
52 "The Committee on Un-American Activities ••• is authorized to make •.. investi-
gations of (I) the extent, character and objects of un-American propaganda activities in 
the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-Ameri-
can propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and 
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and 
(3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary reme-
dial legislation." H. Res. 5, Rule XI, §17 (b), 83d Cong., 1st sess., 99 CoNG. REc. 18 (1953). 
For a discussion of the inherent vagueness of the statute, as well as some legislative attempts 
at definition, see note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 (1947). 
53 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 202 (1957). The enormous range of 
activity covered by the authorization is evidenced to some extent by the organizations the 
committee has investigated since its inception. For a partial list, see United States v. Joseph-
son, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 at 95 (dissenting opinion), cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948). 
54 The House of Representatives extended the life of the special committee five times: 
H. Res. 26, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 84 CoNG. R.Ec. 1098 at 1127-1128 (1939); H. Res. 321, 76th 
Cong., 3d sess., 86 CoNG. REc. 572 (1940); H. Res. 90, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 87 CoNG. REC. 
886, 899 (1941); H. Res. 420, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 88 CONG. REC. 2282, 2297 (1942); H. Res. 
65, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 89 CoNG. REc. 795, 809-810 (1943). This was done with full knowl-
edge that the committee was-spending the major part of its time investigating communism. 
E.g., H. Rep. 2, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939); H. Rep. 2233, 79th Cong., 2d sess. (1946). 
5G See the opinion of Justice Black, dissenting in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 
109 at 140, note 7 (1959). 
56 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812. 
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thorized jurisdiction of the committees strictly would be to fly 
directly in the face of the act, and the Court has apparently felt that 
government efficiency outweighs the individual interest in having 
jurisdiction more specifically defined.57 
B. The Requirement of Pertinency 
Conviction under 2 U.S.C. §19258 can result only if a witness 
refuses to answer questions which are "pertinent to the question 
under inquiry." The term "pertinency" has never been au-
thoritatively defined and, while it is generally equated to relevancy, 
the precise degree of relevancy has not been agreed upon. Some 
courts have suggested that nearly any degree of relevance will make 
the question pertinent, even though the question would not be 
relevant under the rules of evidence.59 Another decision has sug-
gested that in order to be pertinent a question must be in some 
degree "material."60 While "material" is as elusive a term as 
"pertinency," it does at least suggest a stronger relationship be-
tween question and inquiry than that of mere relevancy. In a 
prosecution for perjury, one court has gone so far as to hold that 
material questions are those to which answers might be capable of 
influencing the tribunal on the issue being considered.61 Ques-
tions asked purely to trap the witness into a perjured statement7 
though possibly relevant to the subject of the investigation, were 
not considered "material." This suggests that "materiality" may 
be judged in light of the committee's motive in asking the question. 
This test has never been adopted by a court in a contempt proceed-
mg. 
Whatever standards are used it is clear that possible answers, 
not necessarily the true answer, to the question will determine its 
57 However, Congress seems to have suggested that too vague a definition of jurisdic• 
tion would also result in waste and duplication of function. S. Rep. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d 
sess., p. 5 (1946). See also note, 70 HARV. L. R.Ev. 67r (1957). 
58 "Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either 
House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry 
before ••. any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, 
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .•.. " 52 Stat. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. (1958) §192. 
59 Compare United States v. Orman, (3d Cir.1953) 207 F. (2d) 148 and Townsend 
v. Uni~ed States, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 352 at 361, with I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 
§§31-32 (1941; Supp. 1957). 
60 Bowers v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 447. See also Senate debate on 
the original contempt statute: CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d sess., 439-441 (1857) (favoring 
a rigorous test). 
61 United States v. Icardi, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 383. See also Fraser v. United 
States, (6th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 145 at 149, cert. den. 324 U.S. 842 (1945). 
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pertinency.62 While the witness must reach his own conclusion 
as to pertinency, 63 subject to later judicial review, the courts are 
uniform in holding that the witness must have a fair opportunity 
to make that decision; he is entitled to have knowledge of the 
subject to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent.64 In-
formation from which the witness may make his conclusion must 
be available at the time of the hearing, not at the time of trial, 05 
and it "must be available with the same degree of explicitness and 
clarity that the Due Process Clause requires in the expression of 
any element of a criminal offense."66 
In Watkins v. United States,61 the Court held that the perti-
nency of the question must be made to appear "undisputably 
clear" to the witness and suggested three sources from which the 
information may be derived: (I) the authorizing resolution creat-
ing the committee, 68 (2) the remarks of the chairman or members 
of the committee, and (3) the nature of the proceedings them-
selves. 00 The last two sources have been mentioned generally in 
situations where the authorizing resolution is insufficient to give 
the proper amount of information. 
The use of the authorizing resolution as a means of notification 
has resulted in much difficulty. Under the statute "pertinency" 
relates only to the "question under inquiry." Prior to the estab-
lishment of contempt as a statutory offense, the "question under 
inquiry" was entirely defined by the authorization of the com-
mittee. Investigations were conducted by ad hoc committees, 
whose investigations encompassed the full limit of their author-
ity.70 With the broadening of investigatory authorizations, the 
"question under inquiry" and the jurisdictional reach of the com-
mittee have become separate and distinct entities. As the test for 
62 United States v. Orman, (3d Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 148; Sinclair v. United States, 
279 U.S. 263 (1929). 
63 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 200 (1957); Sinclair v. United States, 279 
U.S. 263 at 299 (1929); United States v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 135 F. Supp. 382. 
<l4 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 209 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345 
U.S. 41 at 45.47 (1953). 
65 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 at 45.47 (1953). 
oo Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 208-209 (1957). See also Scull v. Virginia, 
359 U.S. 344 (1959); Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958). 
01354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
es E.g., Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 at 613 (1929). Some 
members of Congress seem to feel that the authorization is exclusively controlling on 
pertinency. See remarks of Rep. Sherry in debate on H.R. 151, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 101 
CoNG. REc. 3569 (1955). But see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
<l9 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 at 209-215 (1957). 
70 Landis, "Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation," 
40 HAR.v. L. REv. 153 at 170-190 (1926) and cases therein cited. 
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jurisdiction has nothing at all to do with notification of pertinency 
to the witness, 71 the authorization should not be tested for its 
notification qualities. Its function is that of prescribing the area 
in which "questions under inquiry" may fall, and it is only those 
"questions under inquiry" that must be made clear to the witness. 
Moreover, severe problems result if the authorization is con-
sidered as one source of notice. The contempt statute is of a 
criminal nature, and therefore must be judged by criminal stand-
ards.72 If an investigation of pertinency will relate back to the 
authorization, that authorization should have to be sufficiently 
specific to meet criminal tests. But this would make the establish-
ment of permanent committees with broad powers nearly impos-
sible, contrary to the policy of the Legislative Reorganization Act.73 
In recognition of the problem, one court has frankly refused to 
measure the authorization by criminal standards74 and, while 
other courts have purported to do so, it is significant that with one 
exception75 the supposed vagueness of an authorization has never 
prevailed as a conclusive defense in a prosecution for contempt. 
Barenblatt is the first case to make a realistic distinction be-
tween the jurisdictio~al test and the requirements of pertinency. 
In considering whether or not the committee had jurisdiction, the 
Court examined the authorization in the light of its legislative 
history, of which the witness probably had little knowledge.76 But 
in considering the witness's contention that he had not been ap-
rised of the pertinency of the question, the Court considered only 
statements by the committee at the time and the conduct of the 
witness.77 It concluded that together they made the question ap-
pear with "undisputable clarity." 
71 See text at notes 46 through 57 supra. 
72 A penal statute must be phrased in such terms that its words have either (a) a 
technical meaning known to those within their reach; (b) an obvious common law mean-
ing; or (c) a meaning settled by other words in the statute. See Connally v. General Con-
struction Co., 269 U.S. 385 at 391 (1926); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 
81 (1921; note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 at 429 (1947). 
73 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812. 
74 United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58 at 63. But cf. M. Kraus & 
Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 at 620 (1946). 
75 United States v. Peck, (D.C. D.C. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 603. The decision seems to be 
based on a misinterpretation of the Watkins case. See 154 F. Supp. 603 at 608. 
76 Note 55 supra. Justice Black, dissenting, argued that these sources were invalid for 
purposes of ascertaining pertinency, a typical indication of the confusion which may 
easily result. 
77 Five sources of notice were mentioned: (1) the chairman's opening statement, (2) 
the statement at the commencement of the investigation, (3) petitioners previous attend-
ance at the hearings, (4) the fact that petitioner stood mute in the face of the chairman's 
statement as to why he had been called as a witness, and (5) the fact that questions were 
directed at the witness's own affiliations, rather than those of others. Barenblatt v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 109 at 124-125 (1959). 
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While a clear distinction between the test for jurisdiction and 
the test for pertinency may be desirable, it may also lead to some 
disturbing conclusions. Legislative policy dictates judicial toler-
ance of vague and indeterminate authorizing resolutions. Within 
the broad jurisdictional framework, the committee is free to select 
particular areas of inquiry, and to compel testimony pertinent 
to that area. The particular subjects of inquiry selected may not, 
in all cases, correspond to those which Congress had in mind in 
authorizing the investigation. The power to conduct the investiga-
tion has been substantially separated from the direction and respon-
sibility of the investigation. Such separation was condemned in 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,78 under the due process clause. A re-
cent decision, 79 however, has seemingly restricted the Sweezy case 
to the concurring opinion which based the holding upon the 
ground that New Hampshire's interest was insufficient to over-
balance defendant's First Amendment rights.80 
The results of the separation are twofold. First, pertinency 
may no longer be generally represented as justifying compulsory 
testimony by evidencing a close nexus with congressional interest. 
The justification must now be based on a broad statement of con-
gressional purpose, coupled with a specific committee interest. 
Secondly, the protection for a witness has become minimal. While 
questions must be pertinent to a subject of inquiry, the require-
ment loses its effectiveness when there are many questions of in-
quiry upon which a committee may compel testimony. Questions 
not pertinent to a subject under inquiry may be redefined by 
subsequently changing the subject, and if the circumscription 
governing the choice of subjects is vague, a change is easily made. 
The result may be that "pertinency" no longer has meaning as a 
protection from inquiry, now serving only as a protection from 
confusion. 
Perhaps an equally significant departure from established no-
tions of contempt proceedings is the recent suggestion that the 
claim of pertinency may be waived by the witness's failure to object 
78 354 U.S. 234 at 253 (1957): "It is •.• clear that the basic discretion of determining 
the direction of the legislative inquiry has been turned over to the investigating agency. 
The Attorney General has been given such a sweeping and uncertain mandate that it is 
his decision which picks out the subjects that will be pursued, what witnesses will be sum-
moned and what questions will be asked." See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 
at 205 (1957) (dictum). But cf. United States v. Bryan, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58. 
79 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). The same New Hampshire authorization 
was involved in both cases, N.H. Laws 1953, c. 307. 
so Sweezy v. United States, 354 U.S. 234 at 256 (1957). 
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at the time of inquiry.81 Traditionally, pertinence was considered 
an element of the offense which had to be proved by the prosecu-
tion82 and which could not be waived. Though one recent case has 
specifically held that there is no doctrine of waiver,83 the Supreme 
Court has suggested by way of allusion that such a doctrine does 
in fact exist.84 If so, it may be a departure from the view that a 
congressional contempt prosecution is to be treated like any other 
criminal proceeding. In light of the purpose underlying the in-
vestigative process, a doctrine of waiver has no rational basis what-
soever. Whatever the basis of the refusal of the witness to answer 
the question; there is no reason to uphold contempt proceedings 
against him unless there was some purpose to be fulfilled by his 
answering. If the committee, confronted with the witness's refusal 
to reply, did not demonstrate pertinency, the significance of the 
question would seem to be negated.85 
Ill. PROTECTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In the field of political inquiry, reluctant witnesses searching 
for means to protect their names and reputations have generally 
relied upon the Fifth Amendment,86 or the claim of lack of perti-
nency. With the adoption of the term "Fifth Amendment Com-
munist," one of the most precious of our freedoms has, as a practical 
matter, lost much of its original meaning. The solution for some 
witnesses, faced with pertinent questions, has been a flat denial of _ 
the committee's right to inquire into the area of political belief 
and association, an argument grounded on the First Amendment's 
prohibitions. 
81 Barenblatt v. United States, !!60 U.S. 109 at 12!!-124 (1959). See also United States 
v. Kamin, (D.C. Mass. 1956) 1!!6 F. Supp. 791 (dictum); United States v. Bryan, (D .. C. 
D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58. But see Bowers v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 195!!) 202 F. (2d) 447. 
82 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 26!! at 296-297 (1929). See also Christoffel v. 
United States, !!!!8 U.S. 84 (1949) (objection to lack of a quorum need not be raised at a 
time of hearing), distinguished in United States v. Bryan, !!!!9 U.S. !!23 at 329 (1950). 
83 Bowers v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 447. 
84 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 at 123-124 (1959). 
85 lf the committee is sincerely interested in obtaining the testimony there is little 
doubt that they will attempt to show pertinency, whether or not the witness objects on 
that grounds. If they fail to indicate the question's relevance, the conclusion follows that 
their main purpose in asking the question is to trap the witness into grounds for contempt 
proceedings. To require an indication of pertinency, whether or not the witness objects, 
would seem a valid limitation on these particularly flagrant cases of exposure. See note, 
41 MINN. L. REv. 622 at 637 (1957). 
86 See note 1 supra. 
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A. The Policy of the First Amendment 
While perhaps a preferred right,87 freedom of speech has never 
been considered an absolute one.88 Limitations of the right were 
originally grouped in two classes, dependent upon the nature of 
the speech. First, if the language was such that it would tend to 
provoke a criminal act, limitations only of proximity and degree 
were placed upon the utterances. The words must be "of such a 
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent."89 
The doctrine was clarified in a subsequent case in which it was 
stated that the danger must be so "imminent" that "it may befall 
before there is an opportunity for full discussion."00 
The second category of limitation was prescribed in Gitlow v. 
New York,01 where the Court was faced with a statute which made 
speech itself criminal. In this situation, the Court deviated from 
a clear and present danger test, and instead suggested that so long 
as the language has a tendency to create an evil which the state 
may legally prohibit, then the speech itself may be made criminal, 
providing there is a "reasonable" relationship between the speech 
and the state power to regulate the evil. 
Recent decisions have indicated that there is little if any 
merit left in the original distinction because, perhaps, of the dif-
ficult classification of restraining statutes.92 The current test seems 
to be that of balancing the public interest in curtailing the speech 
87 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 529-530 (1945) (speech and assembly); West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 629 (1943) (religion); 
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly); Cahn, "The Firstness of the First 
Amendment," 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956); CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941). 
But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (opinion of Justice Frankfurter). 
88 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Smith Act); American Communi-
cations Assn., C.1.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (non-Communist affidavits); Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (criminal anarchy); note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1208 at 1209-
1210 (1948). But see the opinion of Justice Black in Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 
(1952). 
89 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 at 52 (1919). The evil must be sufficiently 
grave to justify oppression: Terroiniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949); Craig v. Hamey, 
331 U.S. 367 at 373, 378 (1947); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 at 378-379 (1927) 
(concurring opinion). 
90 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 at 377 (1927) (concurring opinion). See also 
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 334 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 at 
262 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 104-106 (1940). 
91268 U.S. 652 (1926). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
92 In particular, the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), now IS U.S.C. (1958) §2385 defines 
as criminal both advocacy and particular overt acts connected with that advocacy. See 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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against the individual's interest in preserving it.93 While courts 
often speak of "clear and present danger," few actually employ the 
test.94 
The balancing test has been criticized as failing to differentiate 
between two fundamental interests involved in the concept of free 
speech. One is the personal right of each individual affected by a 
curtailment. The second, and seemingly more important, is "the 
social interest in the attainment of truth."95 The majority of the 
Court has generally disregarded the second interest in its balancing 
test.96 In opposition to the Court's position, it may be cogently 
argued that the prohibitions of the First Amendment were adopted 
to protect and foster the free flow of ideas, a concept which loses all 
efficacy when considered purely from an individual viewpoint. 
Four of the members of the current Court appear to base their test 
on this enlarged concept, which verges closely on an absolutist in-
terpretation of the First Amendment.97 
B. The Application of the First Amendment to 
Legislative Inquiries 
I. Generally. The extension of the prohibitions of the amend-
ments to investigations as well as "laws" which abridge free speech 
is but a logical extension of the doctrine that any government 
93 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (investigation of Communist activi-
ties); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (criminal libel act); Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Smith Act); American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (non-Communist affidavits from labor leaders); Barsky v. 
United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (investigation 
of Communist activities). 
94 "No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase 'clear and present danger' or how 
closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the weighing of values. They 
tend to convey a delusion of certitude when what is most certain is the complexity of 
the strands in the web of freedom which the judge must disentangle." FREUND, ON UNDER· 
STANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28 (1949), quoted in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494 at 542-543 (1951); note, 101 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 870 at 871 (1953). But see Barsky v. 
United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 246, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948). 
95 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (dissent of Justice Black); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (dissent of Justice Holmes); Meiklejohn, "What Does the First 
Amendment Mean?" 20 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 461 (1953); CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 33, 34, (1941); note, 29 IND. L.J. 162 (1954). 
96 The preoccupation with individual interest may be grounded in the Court's reluc-
tance to allow one individual to raise the constitutional rights of others. E.g., United 
States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 at 90, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948); 
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). But see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 at 255-259 (1953); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 at 183-187 (1951); comment, 27 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 656 (1952). 
97 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. See dissenting opin-
ions in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) and Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 
(1959). Justice Black's language in Barenblatt strongly suggests that no public interest 
could ever overbalance the interest in the free exchange of ideas. 360 U.S. 109 at 144-145. 
1960] COMMENTS 423 
interference with the guaranteed freedoms will be considered 
"abridgement" within the meaning of the amendment.98 That 
the amendment applies specifically to investigative actions has 
been assumed by the present Court to be settled.99 
Equally clear is the recognition that though the amendment is 
couched in terms of speech, it applies to political activity as well.100 
Some writers have suggested that the protection of the "political 
process," involving both belief and activity, was the fundamental 
purpose behind the amendment.101 In defining political activity, 
the Court has been quick to realize that "effective advocacy of both 
public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, 
is undeniably enhanced by group association."102 
Whether "exposing" an individual to the ·wrath of the com-
munity is "interference" or "abridgment" of his political activity 
and belief is not entirely settled. There can be little doubt that 
exposure of a witness may have disastrous effects upon his life, 
effects amounting to a penalty for that political conduct.103 Al-
though the effects are the result of private action, uncontrolled by 
the First Amendment,104 it would be unrealistic to refuse to recog-
nize the government's role in the overall result. The majority of 
cases have recognized that the inhibition of speech and political 
affiliation caused by fear of exposure does constitute an "abridg-
ment" of speech within the confines of the amendment.105 The 
substantiality of government action in the matter, while still re-
98Abridgments which have been invalidated have included licensing, Joseph Burstyn, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); denial of government privileges, Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); criminal statutes, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); 
and taxation, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN 
THE UNITED STATES 9-31 (1948). 
99 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 
178 (1957) (dictum); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (dictum). Cf. Bridges 
v. California, 314 U.S. 252 at 260, 263 (1941). 
100 The Court has often indicated that of all freedoms guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment, political action is most highly protected. E.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 
at 263 (1952); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152-153 (1938); 
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 at 364-365 (1937). 
101 E.g., Meiklejohn, "What Does the First Amendment Mean?" 20 UNIV. CHr. L. 
R.Ev. 461 at 479 (1953). 
·102NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 at 460 (1958). See, generally, Solter, "Freedom of 
Association-A New and Fundamental Civil Right,'' 27 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 652 (1959). 
103 See Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities on Blacklisting, 
84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 5175-5419 (1956). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 at 
531 (1958); Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956). 
104 Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 at 643-644 (1951). 
105 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 
612 (1954) (dictum); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (concurring opinion); 
American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). Cf. Quinn v. 
United States, 349 U.S. 155 at 161 (1955). 
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quired in some degree, seemingly will be presumed if that action 
is the initial one in the government-private action interplay. 
2. Investigation of Un-American Activities. While commit-
tees entrusted with the function of investigation of un-American 
activities have made infrequent glances at right-wing groups,106 
the term has come to mean little more than investigation of the 
Communist Party. Contempt proceedings originating from those 
hearings have brought the question of First Amendment limita-
tions on the committee constantly before the federal courts.107 
The fundamental question the Court has been forced to decide 
is that of the nature of the Communist Party. Traditionally, it 
has not been considered as a merely political group. Either 
through a policy of judicial notice or judicial restraint,108 the 
Court has accepted the expressions of Congress that, regardless of 
its political nature, the party is a conspiratorial and revolutionary 
group, organized to reach ends and to use methods which are in-
compatible with our constitutional system.10° For this reason, the 
Court has consistently refused to view the Communist Party in 
the same light as any other organization, and has upheld legislation 
aimed at it "which in a different context would certainly have 
raised constitutional issues of the gravest character." While a 
possible, if somewhat implausible, argument may be maintained 
that the First Amendment was framed to protect even revolu-
tionary groups,11° the discussion is one of purely academic signifi-
cance, as the point is well settled. 
But while differentiating between legitimate political activity 
which is protected and Communist activity which is not, the Court 
formerly recognized that the latter does not, of necessity, exclude 
lOG Even during the Second World War, the Dies Committee ·scarcely glanced at 
Fascist organizations, and seemingly was verbally supported by them. See Remarks of 
Rep. Sadowski, 89 CONG. REc. 798 (1943). 
107 E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins '{- United States, 
354 U.S. 178 (1957); Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. den. 
334 U.S. 843 (1948); United States v. Josephson, (2d Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 
333 U.S. 838 (1948). The committee has also been responsible for one recognized bill of 
attainder, United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
10s In Barenblatt, the Court considered the formal expression by Congress of the 
aims of the Communist Party as partially determinative of its legitimacy. See Subversive 
Activities Control Act of 1950, Title I of Internal Security Act of 1950, §2, 64 Stat. 987-989. 
For a critical analysis of the application of judicial restraint in the area of civil liberties, 
see Beth, "Group Libel and Free Speech," 39 MINN. L. REv. 167 (1955). 
109 American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 422 (1950) 
(concurring opinion of Justice Jackson). 
110 Both Hamilton and Madison, the framers of the Bill of Rights, seem to have 
recognized a right of revolution: HAMILTON, ~fADISON, AND JAY, THE FEDERALIST, ON TIIE 
NEW CONSTITUTION, XXVIII, 135-136 (1788). 
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the former. Justice Vinson, speaking for the Court in American 
Communications Assn. v. Douds111 observed: "Communists, we 
may assume, carry on legitimate political activities." Justice Jack-
son, concurring in the same case, pointed out that there was a 
fundamental distinction between an oath requiring overt acts of 
affiliation with the party and one which called for disclosure of 
belief unconnected with any overt act.112 _In Wieman v. Upde-
grafj,113 the Court invalidated a loyalty oath because mere party 
association was the determining factor; no distinction had been 
made for innocent association. To inhibit individual freedom by 
"indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity 
must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power."114 In Dejonge v. 
Oregon,m, a unanimous Court held that mere membership in or 
presence at a Communist rally was not significant, unless some 
criminal or violent act had been advocated there. 
These cases seem to be a direct corollary to the "least abridg-
ment" test of the First Amendment, which suggests that while the 
legislature may limit First Amendment freedoms, the means of 
curtailment must lead to the least possible abridgment of those 
freedoms.116 Under this policy, vaguely worded abridgments, 
which have included conduct which could not be fully justified 
by a public need, have been struck down.117 Least abridgment, 
if applied to Communist activities, would mean that simple as-
sociation or membership was too broad a category to be regulated. 
It must be the particular aspects of membership that are a threat 
to society that may be regulated.118 
Barenblatt v. United States 119 is the first case directly involving 
the effect of the First Amendment on congressional investigations 
111 339 U .s. 382 at 393 (1950). 
112 Id. at 435-445. 
11s 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
114 Id. at 191. But d. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Gerende v. 
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951); Gamer v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 • 
(1951) (loyalty oaths upheld when scienter was implicitly required). 
115 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See also Stamps, "Freedom of Assembly," 11 UNIV. KAN. CITY 
L. R.Ev. 187 (1943). 
116 In the following cases, abridgments were struck down as not being the least 
restrictive means of achieving the desired end: Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 at 190 
(1952); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 at 293-295 (1951) (lack of standards for grant of 
license); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 at 307-308 (1940) (criminal law too encom-
passing); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 100 (1940) (criminal law too encompassing). 
117 E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Winter v. New York, 333 
U.S. 507 (1948). Cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); United States v. c.r.o., 
335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
118 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 at 148, note 16 (1959) (dissenting 
opinion of Justice Black). 
119 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
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to be decided by the Supreme Court.120 The witness refused to 
answer questions as to whether he was, or had ever been, a Com-
munist. The Court, in upholding the committee's right to inquire 
into this association, expressly rejected the claim that "because 
the Communist Party may also sponsor peaceable political reforms 
the constitutional issues before us should now be judged as if that 
Party were just an ordinary political party .... "121 The Court has 
thus clearly taken the view, with regard to congressional investiga-
tions, that although there may be a distinction between political 
activity and overt criminal acts, the differentiation will not be 
made within the framework of membership in the Communist 
Party. 
Although the Court refused to consider the party in the same 
light as any other political group, it still recognized that the First 
Amendment would afford protection in some situations. The 
decision in the case was actually reached, not on the basis that the 
Communist Party was not a legitimate group, but rather because 
the public interest in disclosure was greater than the witness's in-
terest in keeping silent.122 Therefore, the majority, while claim-
ing that the party is not legitimate, does not seem to be entirely 
convinced of the fact and has sought an alternative legal technique 
to uphold its result. 
Four members of the Court strongly dissented from the 
opinion. Justice Black, writing for three of the dissenters, rea-
soned that neither the Communist Party nor the particular witness 
lost the full protection of the First Amendment because one of the 
party's aims was violent overthrow of the government. If the 
Court was willing to recognize the party as legitimate, no public 
need could ever justify abridgment of political beliefs and asso-
ciations.123 While Justice Black has often been criticized for his 
absolutist approach to the First Amendment, his rationale would 
seem much more sensible in the area of political freedoms than in 
that of speech.124 It is also significant that at least two, and possibly 
three members of the Court joined Black in his interpretation.125 
120 But see United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 at 47-48 (1953); United States v. 
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 at 626 (1954) (restrictive statutory construction adopted to avoid 
First Amendment problems). And see Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 at 161 (1955). 
121 360 U.S. 109 at 128-129 (1959). 
122 Id. at 126-128. For a discussion of "public interest," see Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494 at 508-509 (1951). 
123 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 at 140-153 (1959) (dissenting opinion of 
Justice Black). 
124 See notes 101 and 102 supra. 
12:; Justices Douglas and Warren concurred in Black's dissent. Justice Brennan dis-
sented separately on the ground that there was no congressional power of exposure for 
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The decision in Barenblatt has restricted Watkins v. United 
States126 to its barest holding-that of the pertinency of the ques-
tion. In doing so, the Court has given enormous power to the Un-
American Activities Committee, a power which the Court in 
Watkins was loathe to confer. The Court has also indicated that 
the balancing test is becoming more and more weighted toward the 
government. In effect, the application of the First Amendment 
has been restricted to currently "safe" political associations. The 
difficulty with this rationale is that it leaves to the individual the 
dangerous function of deciding for himself today what will be 
considered "safe" by the government in the future. This cannot 
but deter persons from engaging in unpopular political activity. 
While it is true that the Court would undoubtedly distinguish 
between unpopular and dangerous political activity, danger is 
merely defined by government doctrine or even propaganda, and 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain future governmental 
policy. It must therefore be recognized that the Court's opinion 
has made serious inroads into First Amendment limitations. If 
protection is to be forthcoming for the reluctant witness, it will 
not be a result of the very amendment framed to protect those 
activities which he refused to disclose. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's reluctance to interfere with the action of con-
gressional committees may be grounded in the thesis that as com-
mittees perform an important and essential function of govern-
ment, restrictions upon them should be kept to a minimum. The 
dilemma the Court faces is how to lay down restrictions on irre-
sponsible committees which would not apply with equal force to 
responsible ones. 
Assuming that some judicial control of investigatory methods 
is desirable, there is a possibility of applying the due process 
clause in certain situations. If "silence" is considered as a liberty, 
it is clear that Congress could compel a witness to speak only by a 
procedure suitable and proper to the particular situation. This 
would involve the establishment by the Court of some basic con-
cepts of "fairness" in committee hearings.127 The difficulty with 
exposure's sake, but did not take issue with Black's analysis of the First Amendment. Cf. 
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 at 82 (1959) (dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan); Scull 
v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 at 353, note 7 (1959). 
126 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
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this test is that it will inevitably involve an investigation of com-
mittee motives in questioning a witness. 
An alternative solution is the establishment of basic procedural 
limitations on committee action, an exercise of legislative self-con-
trol. Many proposals of this nature have been submitted,128 but 
none has received serious consideration, probably because of the 
basic belief that an irresponsible committee could best be cured 
"not by differences in rules but in differences of men."129 The 
decline of the activities of the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee in recent years may also have contributed to congressional 
laxity. However, the possible revival of such activity demands a 
congressional reappraisal of committee procedure. 
A final possibility is that of discarding the balancing test com-
pletely and enforcing the prohibitions of the First Amendment 
absolutely in the area of political activity. The result of a strict 
interpretation of the amendment may not be as chaotic as some 
might imagine. By restricting the absolute prohibitions to the 
political area, the way is left open for control of non-political 
speech. The result in the political sphere would not be to deny 
the nation its right of self-preservation; rather it would require a 
more specific definition of those abuses the nation seeks to preserve 
itself from. Acts of subversion would still remain open to curtail-
ment and investigation, but guilt by association, either judicially 
or publicly, would be foreclosed. Congress might still seek infor-
mation regarding treason or espionage, but it could not act indi-
rectly by equating the abuse to a political party, and then seeking 
information regarding the party. To do so is to supplant the 
policy of the First Amendment with a vague probability ratio, 
which even if nearly conclusive is still no justification for inquiry 
into political association. Criminal sanctions remain available for 
those members of a group who act outside our governmental 
framework, but the First Amendment should remain a bulwark 
of protection for those who work within it. 
Avrum M. Gross, S.Ed. 
127 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 at 191 (1952); note, 47 MICH. L. REv. 181 at 
219 (1948). Cf. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 at 410 (1915). 
12s E.g., H.R. 4564, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947). For a summary of proposed legis-
lation, see Meader, "Limitation on Congressional Investigation," 47 MICH. L. REv. 775 
(1949); note, 23 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 353 (1948). See also procedural rules suggested by 
Wyzanski, J., reprinted in 94 CONG. REc. A 1547 (1948). 
120 94 CoNG. REc. A 1547 (1948). 
